

## ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ANTIQUITY (500 BC- 350BC)

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### Abstract

The common objective of the temple of Apollo at Delphi<sup>3</sup> is associated with that of the United Nations by some Constructivists in International Relations. Delphi and the external relations of the city states on both sides of Aegean Sea in the age of Antiquity between 500 BC and 350 BC are analyzed whether institutions of the Antiquity were capable of forming resolution of conflicts on the basis of mutually agreed and recognized rules, customs and norms. Another objective of the study reveals a cardinal fact that the city states within the context of slavery were function of the slavery system created by the Persian Empire. The relative independence of the slavery city-states owns their historical existence to the requirements of the slavery dependent on the Persian strategies. The versatile relations of the temple of Apollo at Delphi with the city-states are revealed that they were not strong enough to set incentives for forum and rules in organizing certain constructive cooperation and common institutions among the city-states prior to and during the Peloponnesian wars (490 BC-404 BC). Optimal approaches to the analysis of dispute prevention and dispute settlement process particularly focusing on Peloponnesian wars may require distinguishing the various categories of external political and military disputes in accordance with their underlying conflicts of interests. Although some significant contributions by Constructivist Paradigm to the international relations theory are appreciated, there is in Constructivism an idea that needs profoundly criticizing. There is a claim, a point of view which this study opposes. In that respect this study concludes that Delphi was permanently structurally incapable of carrying out a negotiation and arbitration approach to conflict resolution. The role of Delphi was rather a key justifying role than the direct arbitration and

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<sup>3</sup>Delphi was one of the most important ancient religious temples devoted to the god Apollo. The site was settled in the late Bronze Age (1500-1100 BC) but took on its religious importance from around 800 BC. The original name of the temple was Pytho after the snake which Apollo was believed to have killed there. Located near the Gulf of Corinth, the temple was home to the famous oracle of Apollo which gave cryptic predictions and guidance to representatives of city-states including individuals. In 191 BC Delphi came under Roman control. For further information please see: Hornblower, S. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. OUP, (Oxford, 2012).

negotiation role. Conflicting judgments invite the-re-evaluation of Constructivist theoretical approach to the city-state relations in the Antiquity.

**Key Words:** Delphi, slavery, conflict Resolution, arbitration, Constructivism, Persians, Peloponnesian Wars, Athenians, Spartans.

## 1.1 Introduction

Promoting historical consistency between the contemporary international institutions such as the United Nations and the temple of Apollo at Delphi in the Antiquity is required to consider historically distinctive natures of the structures in which international dispute settlement proceedings partake. But this research study rather discusses the characteristics of Delphi than compare it to the United Nations in terms of conflict resolution<sup>4</sup>.

This study aspires to make it clear that the possible explanation of the Delphi's existing structure was not on the basis that it had been run by incompetent people and that a change in morale and performance would have solved the problem of slavery. The inadequacy in arbitration and amoral approaches in the context of moral purpose was much more fundamental. Subsequently, the aim of the argument seeks to state that the international structure for conflict resolution posited by Constructivism in regard to Antiquity seems to be fragmented in its real image. It explicitly points out why the Delphi was but an insufficient institution to account for relations based on her arbitrating role. The external relations between the city states during the Peloponnesian war become the starting point of enquiry.

It will be also argued that the behavior of Athenian city state<sup>5</sup> with respect to her interests drawing gains from slavery was only able to find its meaning in the existence of a continual war. Thus identifying Athenian city state with a major actor in the pursuit of regulating power politics for the

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<sup>4</sup> The word *conflict resolution* is a method by which arbitration and litigation processes can be critically involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict. For further information, please see: Bercovitch, Jacob and Jackson, Richard, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches*, (University of Michigan Press, 2009)

<sup>5</sup> Athenian city state experienced its most glorious times during the 5th century BC before and during the reign of Pericles. Throughout this period the Golden Age of Athenian city-state, Parthenon was build. Arts , Science, Philosophy, Drama, developed to their highest point. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian war between the Athenians including her allies and Sparta alongside with her allies put an end to this glory. For further information, please see: Meier C., *Athens: a portrait of the city in its Golden Age*, translated by R. and R. Kimber (New York, 1998).

sake of her democratic system may be utterly misleading. Athenian city state was manifestly a dominant element in the slavery system<sup>6</sup>. Meanwhile, the discussion is extended to the point at which Athenian city state is identified as a power that inevitably and eventually gave rise to a counter-structure which had been seeking out its basis of support and element of cohesion in the fragmented part of the traditional social forces within the penetrating context of slavery.

To introduce the term arbitration recognized by most of the members of the system with reference to the Delphi obscures the important difference between Antiquity and the 21<sup>st</sup> century, structurally different kinds of periods. Despite the fact that Delphi's obedience to the most powerful city-states seems evident, this study accepts that the Delphi was a respectable institution, commanding a wide measure of consent among the city states, and was able to provide some benefits to the city states up to before the emergence of the slavery period anyway. However, that sort of influence attributed to Delphi seems to have faded away before the dawn of the slavery era. Subsequently, consent wore thin as the city states unevenly began to be dragged into a slavery system in which the element of force and violence became predominant, and it was in the core of the slavery system that the challenge to the Athenian power first became manifest.<sup>7</sup> At the core was a ruthless competition among the slavery city states represented as sudden eruptions of symptoms between the Athenians and others including Megara while at the periphery was a constant fear of disintegration and annihilation represented by the Sparta city state<sup>8</sup>.

Another goal of the study attempts to disclose a fact that the city states within the context of slavery had emerged as an inevitable function of the slavery system under the expansive influence of Persian Empire. The argument is extended to a point at which the structure and network of the city states in connection to the temple of Apollo at Delphi had transformed into meeting the need of the slavery which was being monitored by the Persians.

Since the main issue was whether or not the Delphi became an ineffective instrument into the hands of the variable powers or whether she had moral purpose as insisted by Constructivists, two important question which are raised in that study are: 1) what were the mechanisms forming resolution of conflicts in that particular historical structure? And 2) what forms of state and external relations had existed within that particular historical structure?

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<sup>6</sup> Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, *Ancient World At War*, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005)

<sup>7</sup> Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, *Ancient World At War*, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005)

<sup>8</sup> Please see: Meier, Christian, *The Greek Discovery of Politics*, (Cambridge, 1990)

The analysis of this study would also seek to include some explanatory discussions to the questions raised above. In that case this essay will try to demonstrate that actions of the Delphi for conflict resolutions were constrained and manipulated by the need of the slavery system. At this point, it will be explained that it is preferable for Constructivism to revert to a distorted terminology attributed to Aristotle in order to justify their statement.

This study will try to understand both what is this Greek city states that so draw the theoretical studies in IR and what the theoretical studies in IR find there. Do they reconfirm the claims of constructivists? Do the Greek city states persist a metaphor for the imaginable realm in which the concepts of Constructivism have been placed? Can we read all the documents of the city-states as accounts or witnesses of the actual international relations? Under the pressure of such questions, the ancient city-states may offer this essay a chance to revision the concepts of constructivists. By stepping back into the city states, into what is factual and historical, this paper will seek to analyze nonfactual and ahistorical predicaments of constructivism.

## **2.1 Constructivism and a Network of Institutions as Arbitrators in Antiquity**

Constructivists regard the period of the Greek city-states as the manifestation of the Hobbesian nature of international relations; the primordial period of the international relations dominated by anarchy, insecurity, constant possibility of war among the states.<sup>9</sup> For instance, Alexander Wendt claims that “Judging from the violence and high death rate of states in the past it seems clear that world politics has often been Hobbesian.”<sup>10</sup> By this statement he also means that the functions and roles of the Greek city-states in essence are similar to those of the modern states. But, in that discourse he spots only one problem which is about ‘ignoring important differences in the systemic context’. However, he argues that those ‘important differences’ could be overcome provided “the structure is conceptualized in cultural terms”<sup>11</sup>. Subsequently through that angle of the view, he suggests that any valid transhistorical generalizations become possible.

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<sup>9</sup> For Further Information please see: Strauss, Leo, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, (The University of Chicago Press, 1963)

<sup>10</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.279

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p.214

For Constructivists “it is only through the interaction of state agents that the structure of the international system is produced, reproduced, and sometimes transformed.”<sup>12</sup> That is, without the interaction of state agents we could not mention of any change or transformation in the structure of the international system. In another word, the structure of the international system, the patterns of cooperation, changes and transformation in the structure of IR are all reduced to the interactions of the state agents. Due to such an abstraction, they return to the Greek city states in order to seek the nature and genesis of the contemporary fundamental institutions. That is, they isolate sociology from history, and summarize that randomness governs IR. For in its most simplistic form, Constructivists invent a fundamental institution of third-party arbitration to support their claims about patterns of cooperation. Delphi is considered an interstate organization which is thought to have been produced by the interactions of the Greek city-states agents. Did Delphi really an interstate organization resemble the United Nations?

In his writing, moral codes, including those which attempt the simplification of universality are the lateralization of Aristotle’s thoughts. As a consequence, this study sets out to de-moralize the moral codes from the moralistic fallacy of constructivism which reads the Peloponnesian war in terms of good and bad, right and wrong. This requires the fiction of a fixed subject (arbitration), the choosers (city-states), and the fixer (oracles at Delphi). This moralistic fallacy is central to the myth of institution, a kind of identification projection, the source of heroic behavior which was essential for sustaining slavery of the city states..

## **2.2 Constructivism and City States**

To the constructivists, the Greek city-states are usually a universal standard against which all events are measured. For example, as a constructivist Christian Reus-Smit says that “The ancient Greek system of city-states occupies a special place in the study of international relations. It stands as one of the great analogues of the modern state system, a familiar world of independent states in which the eternal varieties of international politics are thought to have appeared in their most rudimentary and essential form.”<sup>13</sup>

In that context, Constructivists try to be highlighting the historically existence of patterns of cooperation by means of an international institutions as their intellectual efforts are placed upon thrashing out the differences between distinct periods of history. Like Alexander Wendt, Christian

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<sup>12</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.365

<sup>13</sup> Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of The State*, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p.40

Reus-Smit as another constructivist thinker follows suit as well. By such a reductionist method, one may witness that the structure and functions of the Greek city-states are subjected to an imagined transhistorical generalization. Therefore, Christian Reus-Smit may be seen as complying with the principle of Alexander Wendt, namely conceptualizing the structure and roles of the ancient city-states in cultural terms, but implicitly in distorted ones.

Like modern states, Greek city-states are believed by Constructivists to have established a network of institutions to facilitate cooperation, negotiations, and arbitrations. They are imagined to have favored the practice of third party arbitration in the absence of experiencing ‘contractual international law and multilateralism’. They argue that the Greek city-states were bound together by the Oracles at Delphi similar to a constitutional structure by which the state is thought to gain her social identity. “Arbitration was the core fundamental institution, but it was nested within a web of lesser institutions.” says Christian Reus, “The oracle at Delphi and the periodic Olympic festivals are the best known, yet least important politically... The Oracle was the paramount religious institution in ancient Greece, and it often issued political advice to city-states... Delphi exerted greater political influence through another type of interstate institution.”<sup>14</sup>

### **3.1 The Archaic Background of Delphi**

In archaic Greece (750-480 BC) among city-states treaties and alliances including arbitration were useful tools to avoid the violent resolution conflicts. Cities would appoint arbitrators to settle inter-city conflicts<sup>15</sup>. A group of men would stand above the conflicting parties; enjoy an independent third position acting as mediators to all concerned<sup>16</sup>. The highest religious authority the oracle of Apollo in Delphi promoted principles of moderation even in warfare<sup>17</sup>.

The effectiveness of Delphi over the city-states might have happened to have materialized at a time when there was almost no trade within and among the cities in which the division of labor including the divided function and role of the city states was very low<sup>18</sup>. Among the native people was also hostility toward any kind of the trade and trading relations. For instance the exportation of oil which was the only exported product in Attica at the time was secured by law issued by Solon (658 BC-538BC) who was an Athenian politician, lawmaker and poet. “This law is inscribed upon the first of

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<sup>14</sup> Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of The State*, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p.44

<sup>15</sup> Please see: Aeger, S. L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World*, (Berkeley, 1996)

<sup>16</sup> Meier, Christian, *The Greek Discovery of Politics*, (Cambridge, 1990), p.28-52

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p.33

<sup>18</sup> Please see: Aeger, S. L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World*, (Berkeley, 1996)

his tables, so that there seems to be some evidence for the tradition that the export of figs was prohibited in ancient times.”<sup>19</sup> Likewise, Thucydides suggests that in former times there was no mercantile traffic.<sup>20</sup> There were no any structures which could have a tradition of containing and tolerating any sort of commerce except the enforced intervention by the law itself until the slavery became a complicated and relatively accepted system. By then, in the absence of a well-developed mercantile traffic, Delphi would be thought to have experienced its golden era<sup>21</sup>. The existence of commercial relations at primitive levels between the city states might furnish the Delphi as great institution of arbitration.

However, due to eventual developments of the trade including a complex development in the slavery associated with the division of labor induced by the expansion of the Persian slavery system and the slowly growing appearance of polarization between the cities and country, Delphi may seem to have begun to effectively lose its traditional identity and respected cultural position<sup>22</sup>.

#### **4.1 The Persians, the City-States and Delphi**

In antiquity, old practices and methods occurred prior to the slavery period always co-existed alongside the emerging slavery. The development in the distribution of slavery among the city-states was uneven: The coastal area of the European side of the Aegean Sea had devolved into slavery markets by the Persians; people living in Asia minor appeared to have been sold out as slaves, the import and export of whom were organized by the city-states under the guidance of the Persian Empire<sup>23</sup>. The growing power of the city-states and the enlarged slave markets existed were the product and function of the Persians. The inlands in Asia Minor used to serve as mechanism that would produce slaves who were considered rebels revolting against the Persian rule.<sup>24</sup>

Relatively after two centuries during which time the mode of slave production seems to have settled down with its own specific contradictory institutions and conflicts, when we arrived at the period of Pericles in Athens (461 BC-429 BC), Delphi had already been transformed into an instrument into the hands of cities as vassal of either Athens or Sparta or Corinth. It was no longer a common

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<sup>19</sup> Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens*, (Penguin Books, 1964), p.66

<sup>20</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), p.5

<sup>21</sup> Please see: Aeger, S. L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World*, (Berkeley, 1996)

<sup>22</sup> Please see: Meier, Christian, *The Greek Discovery of Politics*, (Cambridge, 1990)

<sup>23</sup> Please see: *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia*, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005)

<sup>24</sup> Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, *Ancient World At War*, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005)

respectable religious institution, had already lost her impartiality, but seems to have turned into an instrument being controlled by the interests of the unstable nature of the alignments of the cities.

The Development of slavery and the competition for the process of enslaving people transformed the nature of the relationships among the city-states in Greece under the pressure of the Persian Empire. The instinct for slavery gave way to fear and anxiety for annihilation within each state. Military balance had mixed with unrest and unsettled feelings about whether their city-states would resume surviving the ruthless enslaving conditions<sup>25</sup>.

The persistence of the fear for the enslavement was so deep and acute that it lasted centuries. One could observe the deep and irrational anxiety of the city states forty years after the end of Peloponnesian War (432 BC- 404 BC). For example, with the strategy of enslaving the Peloponnesians, Corinthians had designed another war against both Spartans and Athenians. But to form an alliance with Argos, Corinthians had employed some fears of enslavement about Argos, and convinced them of the intention of Athenians and Spartans, hence successfully drove the Argos to war<sup>26</sup>. Empirical evidence shows that such fear about the enslavement had been an essential provocation to move city-states to major wars.

#### **4.2 The Persian Aims in the 490s BC and Delphi's Misjudgment**

The Delian League was formed late in 478 BC<sup>27</sup>. In the aftermath of the success of the Greek navies and revolt of city states, in 479-478 BC the defeated Persians moved along the coast restoring order in city after city in Asia Minor with fleet and army moving together<sup>28</sup>. It had ensured that the victory of the city states on the European side against the Persians could have been prevented from spreading over Minor Asia. Through the city-states in Minor Asia, did the Persians would aim at controlling the functioning structure of slavery trade in the city-states on the European continent side of the Aegean Sea. A similar strategy by the Persians had been applied in 469 BC. The goal of the resumption of the Persian Empire over the city-states in Greece was reduced to a commitment to maintaining slavery trades within and across the city states. The perceptual change in politics and actual adjustments to economic development solidified in strategy and diplomacy of the Persians. The

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<sup>25</sup> Please see: Meier, Christian, *The Greek Discovery of Politics*, (Cambridge, 1990)

<sup>26</sup> Kagan, Donald, *The Peloponnesian War*, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.200-201

<sup>27</sup> Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, *Ancient World At War*, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005)

<sup>28</sup> *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia*, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.135



Persians began applying a strategy in which they decided to see whether they could secure by diplomacy something of what they had not been able to secure by force<sup>29</sup>.

The Persians' purposes were twofold. They sought to secure undisputed control over all of Asia. Secondly they wanted a settled order within Greece that would occasion them the least trouble.<sup>30</sup> Since trouble had come from naval power, they would be best served by enforcing a system that required city states to be autonomous. But autonomy would not flourish to be left to itself. When the Persians' agent city states would fail to keep control over the rest of the city states, the Persians would and did intervene<sup>31</sup>. The ending of Peloponnesian wars explicitly refers to that reality. Those who did not accept such a condition would have to be coerced by joint action. The peace of Thebes in 366 illustrates this<sup>32</sup>. In 367 Thebans had sought to institute a Persians peace with themselves the leading power, that is, peace and alliance.

By the mid-fifth century the city states in Greece was polarized due to the competition for slavery. Two power blocks appeared to emerge, led by the Athens and Sparta<sup>33</sup>. Those seeking to remain neutral were viewed with suspicion by both block members<sup>34</sup>. This polarization made arbitration and consequently the peaceful resolution of conflicts almost impossible<sup>35</sup>.

Arbitration between two power blocks was unable to work since there had been no superior institution or agency that had sufficient authority to be recognized by both power blocks members. In addition the prevailing political culture would encourage violent conflict resolution rather than peaceful resolution<sup>36</sup>. The arbitration clause in the 'Thirty Years Treaty' of 446 BC between two

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.135

<sup>30</sup> Please see: *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia*, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005)

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.183

<sup>32</sup> (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 6. 10)

<sup>33</sup> Sparta as a city state grew strong to become the dominant military land-power in ancient Greece around 650 BC. Sparta led the campaign as the leader of the combined city-states forces during the Greco-Persian Wars at the beginning of the fifth century. Between 431 and 404 BC, Sparta was the enemy of Athenian city-state throughout the Peloponnesian War Sparta with the financial aid of the Persians emerged victorious. 34 years after the victory of the Spartans, Thebes receiving the financial support of the Persians ended Sparta's role in 371 BC. For further information, please see: Cartledge Paul, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 BC* (2 ed.), (Oxford: Routledge, 2002)

<sup>34</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), 5.84-114

<sup>35</sup> Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. *Warfare in the Ancient World*. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989

<sup>36</sup> Kagan, Donald, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*, (New York, 1995), ch.1

power blocks failed to come into effect just before the eruption of the Peloponnesian war in 432 BC.<sup>37</sup>

The intervention of the Persians in the affairs of the Greek city states had profoundly transformed the structure of the city states in which the function and role of Delphi appears significantly paralyzed and changed. Such changes led the city-states to solidify their gains through more effective institutions. The search for securing their gains through slavery happened to have polarized the relations between city-states and the Persian Empire. That kind of polarization leading to revolts and temporary alliances seems to harden the position of the Persians in a broader region.

In that sense, the Persian aim in the 490s BC was rather to begin the incorporation of mainland Greece within the Empire. At the beginning of the fifth century BC, namely around 480 BC, Sparta and Athens including other city states were allied to each other against the Persian Empire. As soon as city-states on the European continent knew that Greece was to be invaded, they took effective action to unite. Delphi clearly expected the city-states in Greece to be largely overrun, and issued dire oracles<sup>38</sup>. Delphi clearly believed the Persians to defeat the united front of the city-states. However, in 480-479 BC the Persians failed to win over the city-states. The power of the Persians was confined to Asia<sup>39</sup>. And the dire prediction of the Delphi's oracle had proved wrong.

### **5.1 Peloponnesian Wars**

In the aftermath of the defeat of the Persian Empire, as happened before the war, Spartans had been preoccupied with the population of their neighbor city, called Messenia that had been enslaved by Spartans. As slave owners and land oriented power, Spartans were concerned with maintaining the status quo. 'They were unwilling to commit their forces too extensively overseas'<sup>40</sup>. Athenians took over Spartans' leadership, the confederacy of the Athenians and their allies, later known as the Delian League, came into existence.<sup>41</sup> The purpose of the Delian League was supposed to be mutual protection against Persia. The autonomy of all member city states would be respected; and their representatives took an oath of loyalty to the League- an oath which was permanently binding.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., ch.1 Kagan, Donald, *The Peloponnesian War*, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005),

<sup>38</sup> Herodotus, *The History*, translated by David Grene, (Columbia University Press, 1988),. 7. 136. 9

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Michael Grant, *The Classical Greeks*, (Phoenix Press, 1988), p.29

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p.29-30

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p.31

The taxes by each member city states were being pooled in the island of Delos; but, Athenians moved the treasury to Athens (454 BC), claiming monopoly over the accumulated taxes due to their increasing naval power. They relied on trading slaves and the sea oriented and slave owned commercial characteristic of their city state. Athens was rather an expansionist power. This expansionist behavior may be related to the exploitation of the fears of the small city states through the Delian League. It had consolidated her control over her allies under the pretext of mutual protection against the Persians.

On the Peloponnesian peninsula, Spartans and her allies established another League in order to deal with the growing power of the Athens and its allies.<sup>43</sup> Due to the needs caused by the slavery, Athens began to use the Delian League's navy for its own interests. The behavior of Athens had been frequently challenged by the less powerful members of the League. The first Peloponnesian War between two camps broke out in 461 BC and ended in 445 BC. That war was sealed off by a treaty that ensures peace for 30 years. The treaty had been brokered by the rulers of both Spartans and Athenians. No involvement of Delphi was present for the settlement. That is, in the process of negotiation between two camps, Delphi was not an instrument for conflict settlement, but the certain individuals from both Athenians and Spartans for resolving the issue of the first Peloponnesian war. That peace agreement did not last long; the second Peloponnesian War broke out in 431 BC which led to a catastrophe, engulfing at least 120 city states together, driving all those city-states into a very brutal and cruel war..

## **5.2 The Second Peloponnesian War**

Thucydides states that the cause of the second Peloponnesian war was the result of the growth of the power of Athens and the worries and fears it caused in Sparta and her allies. Spartans worried about the growing power of Athens, but they were also fearful that their slaves could have revolted in case they got engaged in war<sup>44</sup>. Athens and Spartans were slave states; going to war may have provided opportunities for the slaves to revolt. The possibility of such revolts were refraining both power from entering into a devastating war. Meanwhile, one of the slavery city states called Corinth, who as rivals were competing with Athens, considered and assumed that due to fear of Athens about slave revolts, Athens could have avoided entering war. Overriding that belief, Corinth harnessed a revolt in a city state called Epidamnus on the periphery to empower her position against Athens. In contrary to what Corinth calculated Athens advocated the opposing groups in that city against the supporters of

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<sup>43</sup> Kagan, Donald, *The Peloponnesian War*, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.332

<sup>44</sup> Kagan, Donald, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Cornell University Press, 1969), p.354.

the Corinth and decided to go to war in 431 BC<sup>45</sup>. By 431 BC, Athens' heavy-handed control of the Delian League helped prompt the outbreak of the Peloponnesian.<sup>46</sup>

Before Athenian offensive, Corinthians turned to Spartans for manpower. In order for Corinthians to ally with Sparta against their enemy, they successfully exploited Spartans' fear about the enslavement by the Athenians. They had used the threat of the secession and the prospect of an alliance with Sparta.<sup>47</sup>

In 431, the second Peloponnesian war broke out, a war in which most of the city states took part.<sup>48</sup> The second Peloponnesian war ended with the defeat of the Athens and her allies in 404 BC. The resultant end of war and developments after the war proved that none of the city states in reality won the war but only the Persians who used to control the consequences of the war by her financial assistance without the involvement of military power.<sup>49</sup>

### 5.3 Peloponnesian Wars and the Persians

Once the Peloponnesian wars began, seeking Persian aid was an obvious way for the Spartans and her allies to counter Athens naval and financial superiority. The Spartans sent their ambassadors to the Persians to seek the help of the Persian King<sup>50</sup>. Athenians sought to encourage the Persians to maintain his neutrality<sup>51</sup>. The Peloponnesians people needed money to man large fleets, the embassies to Persia sought Persian gold. But the Persian King gave nothing<sup>52</sup>. In a prolonged war, the basic aim of the Persians was to see her formal clients and rivals weakened through war.

The Spartans had entered the war with a proclamation that they were freeing Greece<sup>53</sup>. They meant freedom from Athenian rule, freedom from the enslavement process. The envoy with the message

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<sup>45</sup> G. E. M. De Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Cornell University Press), 1972, p. 201-203

<sup>46</sup> Toivo Koivukoski (eds.): *Enduring Empire. Ancient Lessons for Global Politics*. (London 2009)

<sup>47</sup> Kagan Donald, *The Peloponnesian War*, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.200

<sup>48</sup> W. A Hurlley, H. C. Darby, *A Short History of Greece*, (Cambridge University Press), p.17

<sup>49</sup> For further information on the involvement of the Persians in Peloponnesian War, please see: Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Books 1-4, Translated by L. Brownson, (Harvard University Press, 2003).

<sup>50</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), 2.7.1

<sup>51</sup> *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia*, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.142

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p.142

<sup>53</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), 2.8.4-4.85.1

was captured and sent to Athens. Athens' counter-embassy was turned back by news of the Persian King<sup>54</sup>.

In the first decade of the war, Persians had distanced themselves from the conflicting parties, expecting them to weaken one another so that her domination in the region would come into existence. However, after the Sicilian campaign<sup>55</sup> Athens were believed to collapse in 413 BC. In the next two years the Athenians confronted uprisings and upheavals at home<sup>56</sup>. Predictions that Athenians could collapse turned out to be premature. The rest of Peloponnesian war was powerfully shaped by the Persian Empire.<sup>57</sup>

Athenians had become a weak city state; but it was evident that the Spartans and their allies could not win without building a fleet and defeating Athens at sea. This could be done only by gaining the financial and military support of the Persians. The Athenians, too, needed money to rebuild their fleet. After the war in Sicily, attention shifted eastward, to the king of Persia and the satraps of his western provinces.<sup>58</sup>

In 412-411 BC it was certainly the case that Persian help for Sparta was less than generous and in effect enabled Athens to continue the war. Persians played the city states off against each other<sup>59</sup>. The reason why Persia did not exploit Athens's preoccupation in the early years of the Peloponnesian war was that Persian state saw it was to Persia's advantage to fight it out. It was an obvious strategy. From 411 BC to the end of the war the Persian King declined to intervene despite the pleas of his son Cyrus<sup>60</sup>. Then came the change. In 407 BC Cyrus came down as commander to conduct with the Spartans the war against Athens<sup>61</sup>. In 406 BC the Athenians made an approach to Cyrus after the Spartan envoy declared that they had secured all they wanted from the Persian king<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>54</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), 4.50. 3

<sup>55</sup> Sicilian campaign of Athenians in 415 BC ended in the defeat of Athens. Athens met total destruction,-their army, their ships and everything were destroyed. For further information, please see: <sup>55</sup> Kagan, Donald, *The Peloponnesian War*, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.313-325.

<sup>56</sup> Kagan, Donald, *The Peloponnesian War*, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005),, p.325

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. P.325

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.,p.325-26

<sup>59</sup> Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. *Warfare in the Ancient World*. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989

<sup>60</sup> Cawkwell, George, *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia*, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.155

<sup>61</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harvard University Press, I. 4. 3

<sup>62</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harvard University Press,I. 5. 8

The Athenian embassy had been turned down. Cyrus provided the money necessary for the maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet<sup>63</sup>.

Cyrus said to the leader of the Spartans, Lysander, that if funds provided by the Persian King ran out he would use his own money<sup>64</sup>. Similarly, the battle in 406 BC was a fearful disaster for the Peloponnesian fleet. Without the support of Cyrus, Sparta might have given up struggle. The Persian King had lack of enthusiasm for the final defeat of Athens; he did not want to send naval force which he had withdrawn in 411 BC. Cyrus told Lysander not to fight a sea- battle unless he has a far greater number of ships<sup>65</sup>. Because, for the defeat of Athens, an overwhelming naval force had seemed essential. The Persians were reluctant to allow the Spartans and her allies to finalize the war. The real proof of the Persian King's lack of enthusiasm for the final defeat of Athens is provided by his failure to send again the naval force which he had withdrawn in 411 BC.<sup>66</sup>

Although Sparta was financially supported by the Persians for preparing the path leading to the demise of the Athenians, the Persian Empire remained suspicious about the intention of Sparta after the war. If Athenians were thrown out of Asia, the Spartans having liberated the city states of mainland Greece would not leave the city states of Asia to the mercy of the Persians<sup>67</sup>.

### **6.1 Function of Delphi in Peloponnesian Wars**

What was the function of Delphi in seeking a resettlement to the war? It may be noticed that Delphi was not taken into account as a serious institution that could have brokered conflict resolution. The events to the formulation and execution of the settlement between the city-states may unfold the role and function of certain individuals and dynamics of the period on the basis of creating stability through balance of power.

In 404 BC, Athenians accepted their defeat. Athenians could not postpone peace negotiations since the pressure of hunger became intolerable. But, who was responsible for conflict resolution? Delphi? Not at all. Theramenes, as an Athenian general, was held responsible by the Athenians for negotiations and conflict resolution. Delphi is not mentioned of as an arbitrator between the Athens and Sparta and her allies. Theramenes proposed to seek out Lysander, the leader of Sparta; because

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<sup>63</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), 2. 65.12

<sup>64</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harward University Press, 1. 5. 3

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 2. 1. 14

<sup>66</sup> The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.172

<sup>67</sup> The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.184

Sparta and her allies meant to destroy Athens and its people. Athenians voted him full powers to negotiate peace. Theramenes found Lysander at Samos and stayed with him there for three months.<sup>68</sup> He made significant progress in the long discussion with Lysander, and had been in a position to achieve a more satisfactory peace. The Spartans agreed to a settlement that left Athens intact and its people alive and free. Athenians was given an opportunity to remain autonomous. The reason for the long discussion with Lysander was that Spartans tried to counter the argument of Corinthians and Thebans. Because, Spartan allies proposed that ‘the city be levelled and the countryside left a posture for sheep.’<sup>69</sup> Their purpose was to become a hegemonic power in slavery, and accordingly they wanted to enslave the Athenian people. However, Sparta in considering the expansion of both Corinthians and Thebes felt threatened in the future, decided to form a balance between Athens and her allies mainly Corinth and Thebe<sup>70</sup>.

The existence of Sparta was made dependent on the balance between these city-states as it was so just before the outbreak of Peloponnesian wars. The conflict resolution, negotiation between Athens and Sparta with her allies took hold due to the basic concerns of Sparta’s historical structure rather than the intervention of Delphi according to some ethical values and concerns.

Meanwhile, the efforts of Sparta to counterbalance her close alliances with the restoration of Athens also would stand to overlap with the interests of the Persian Empire. Persians did not let the Spartans crush utterly Athens. Athens was left free to get on with the reestablishment of her power. Athenians revived financial institutions of the Fifth century Empire and the Persia had been faced with the return of Athenian power<sup>71</sup>. In that respect the Persians accepted the Spartan’s offer, the Persians made Sparta counterbalance Athens.

After the final defeat of the Athenians in 404 BC, the Spartans decided to extend their power to the city- states of Asia which were under control of the Persians<sup>72</sup>. Maintaining control over the politics of the cities of the mainland Greece and seeking to liberate the cities of Asia from Persians control were inconsistent and too much for Sparta to manage. The Spartan army had been obliged to abandon the Asiatic cities. The naval victory of the Persian fleet in 394 BC set the seal on it all.

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<sup>68</sup> Kagan Donald, *The Peloponnesian War*, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.480-81

<sup>69</sup> Plutarch, *Lysander*, 15-2

<sup>70</sup> Kagan Donald, *The Peloponnesian War*, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.480-81

<sup>71</sup> *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia*, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), *Ibid.*, p.168

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p.188

There would be no question of negotiations between Sparta and Persia. The Persians would arrange things entirely to their own satisfactions. They abandoned and claim to the cities of Asia and they accepted that ‘all the islands and the rest of the cities of Greece should be autonomous’<sup>73</sup>. In 386 BC the Persians peace settled the business. The Persian peace kept the Greeks out of Asia and autonomous city-states until the king of Macedon took charge of Greece.<sup>74</sup>

## 6.2 The misperceived Function of Delphi by Constructivism in Peloponnesian Wars

Delphi used to tend to think of conflicts in terms of an aggressor and a victim. The aggressor was the party who would set the conflict motion. They tended to think that the aggressor had a certain objective to be reached and the victim’s objective was to resist the aggressor.<sup>75</sup> This was the simplistic view of a conflict. The aggressor was in the wrong and must have been resisted. It may have been that the aggressor’s objective would offer special benefits to him; maybe that objective might not disadvantage the victim<sup>76</sup>. They failed to look beyond the first stated objectives; they were unable to look beyond the simple label of aggressor and victim.

In spite of a qualitative change in the function of Delphi from impartiality to partiality due to the distribution of power among the city states shaped by the slavery, the constructivists, regardless of the historical differentiation, consider that as their principle institutional practice, the city-states are considered to have adopted arbitration for which Delphi is imagined as a main organization. Constructivists go further by claiming that only ancient city-states embraced the decision of a third party with more commitment and consistency in history. “The prevailing conception of the moral purpose of the state,” argues Christian Reus-Smit, “which defined legitimate statehood in ancient Greece, entailed a distinctive understanding of procedural justice, an understanding embodied in the practice of interstate arbitration.”<sup>77</sup> In order to verify, acknowledge and prove his proposition he insists that “Aristotle was a self-empiricist.”<sup>78</sup> All his propositions have been depended on whether Aristotle<sup>79</sup> was a self-empiricist.

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<sup>73</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harvard University Press, 4. 8.14

<sup>74</sup> The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.186

<sup>75</sup> Please see: Aeger, S. L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World*, (Berkeley, 1996)

<sup>76</sup> Please See: Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of The State*, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p.45

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p.46

<sup>79</sup> Aristotle was born in 384 BC in Stagirus, a seaport on the coast of Thrace and died in 322 BC. Aristotle joined the Athenian Academy to study under Plato, attended Plato’s lectures for twenty years. Plato theorized that ultimate reality is



That said, he finds it very easy ethically to reduce Aristotle's ethical and political writings to the reflection of the essence of the social and political world in which Peloponnesian wars took place. For instance, when Aristotle says "proper function of man consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle"<sup>80</sup>, the political implication of that statement is directly linked to that of the ancient Greek people. It is not considered that it was 'a generalization of proper function of man' in accordance with Aristotle's doctrine, but the actualized 'proper function of the Greek people.' And Aristotle's rational principle concerning with the expression of reason as the perception of good and evil, just and unjust is again linked by Constructivists to the articulation of moral claims of the ancient Greek people. He argues that "the moral purpose of the ancient Greek city-states thus lay in the cultivation of *bios politikos*, a form of communal life characterized by the rational pursuit of justice through action and speech."<sup>81</sup>

### **6.3 The Role of Friendship Instead of Delphi for Conflict Resolution**

With the contribution of three cases, the space of questioning is extended to 'moral purpose' of the city-states. Before the outbreak of the second Peloponnesian war, in 446 BC the Euboeans and the Peloponnesian states concerted an uprising against the Athens while Attica was sieged by the Spartan army. Pericles<sup>82</sup> decided to avoid an engagement with the Spartan army commanded by Pleistoanax; instead he sought to resolve it through the negotiation. Pericles "took note of the fact that Pleistoanax was a very young man and that among his advisers he relied mainly on Cleandridas, whom the ephors had sent out with him on account of the king's youth to act as his tutor and adviser. Pericles opened secret negotiations with Cleandridas and soon succeeded in corrupting him with bribes and prevailing on him to withdraw the Peloponnesian army from Attica."<sup>83</sup> In here Pericles openly violates the so-called rational principles, ending the conflict by means of bribery without the interference of any Oracle issued at Delphi, or a third party arbitration.

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only knowable through reason and reflection, and he located it in ideas or eternal forms. Aristotle differed from his teacher, theorizing that ultimate reality is knowable through experience, residing in physical objects, and his writings were often based on first-hand observation as well as on his doctrine. For further information, please see: Richard Sorabji, ed. *Aristotle Transformed* (London, 1990)

<sup>80</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I.8, 19.

<sup>81</sup> Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of The State*, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p.46

<sup>82</sup> Pericles (495 – 429 BC) was one of the most influential statesman and general of Athenian army during the so called 'Golden Age' of the Athenian city-state. Pericles converted the Delian League into an influential and powerful Athenian city state, and led his countrymen during the first two years of the Peloponnesian War until he died of plague. The period from 461 to 429 BC is known as the Age of Pericles. For further information, please see: Aird, Hamish (2004). *Pericles: The Rise and Fall of Athenian Democracy*. The Rosen Publishing Group.

In another example, in 457 B.C when the Athenians under the rule of Pericles was about to be defeated by the Spartans who invaded the district of Tanagra, Cimon, who was overthrown from the power of Athena, ostracized and sent to exile by Pericles had been brought back after Pericles proposed the decree to recall him. “Thereupon, Cimon returned from exile and negotiated a peace between the two cities, for the Spartans were as well disposed towards him as they were hostile to Pericles.”<sup>84</sup> As a former leader of the Aristocrat party in Athens advocating an alliance with Sparta, Cimon brokered a peace deal with their enemy. Again we could not see the influence of Delphi or any kind of a third party except the contribution of a friendship and close connection between Cimon as an Athenian and the Spartan king to a peaceful settlement. That is, peace between the city-states is usually brokered by the certain individuals rather than by Delphi.

Furthermore, Delphi was held in check by the bribery that Spartans “had bribed the priestess at Delphi constantly to answer the Lacedaemonians<sup>85</sup>, whenever they came to consult the oracle.”<sup>86</sup> As concerns arbitration, the role of the Delphi appears to have highlighted the need for justification of aggression and offensive much more effective than the need for mediation and arbitration.

Delphi was never designed for the task of arbitration; but she was called upon to perform that task because there was no other way of justifying the decision on war<sup>87</sup>. It may have been that the structure might have been adequate at one time during the proslavery period, but the changes in the structure and relations of city states appeared to make Delphi inadequate. The nature of the task had profoundly changed. Conflict resolution during the slavery period had been very different from what it used to be for the proslavery period.

### **7.1 Misjudgment of Morality of City-states by Constructivism**

Christian Reus-Smit also refuses to accept that the so-called institution was arranged as an instrument of power conflicts. In that sense he insists that “the institution does not appear to have been reduced simply to an instrument of imperial power. The practice undoubtedly contributed to the internal stability of imperial leagues, thus serving hegemonic interests. Hegemony seldom acted as

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<sup>83</sup> Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens*, (Penguin Books, 1964), p.188

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p.175

<sup>85</sup> “In the classical period, the southern Peloponnese under Spartan control was commonly called ‘Laceonian (land). The territory was also referred to as Lacedaemonians” Nigel M. Kennel, *Spartans*, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p.4

<sup>86</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books V-VI, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), p.31

<sup>87</sup> Please see: Aeger, S. L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World*, (Berkeley, 1996)

arbitrators, though, and there is little evidence to suggest that decision were consistently slanted in their favor. If they had been, the willingness of other states to submit to arbitration would surely have vanned, leading to the institution's steady erosion, which did not occur"<sup>88</sup> Again we observe another false generalization. For hegemony frequently would act as arbitrators instead of allowing any third party like Delphi to resolve the matters, numerous events of which are indicated in the writings of Thucydides.

Further, we also see Delphi advising not only on peace settlement but on waging war as well<sup>89</sup>. For instance, when Athena tried to dominate over the other city-states by means of warships and internal uprisings in 439 BC, Lacedaemonians decided to retaliate against Athenian military power. Therefore, when Delphi was under the influence of Sparta, "The Lacedaemonians themselves, then, had decided that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi they asked the god if it would be advisable for them to go to war. The god answered them, as it is said, that if they warred with all their might, victory would be theirs, and said that he himself would help them, whether invoked or uninvoked."<sup>90</sup> As seen in Thucydides, Delphi seems to have promised that the gods would come to the aid of Lacedaemonians should they have gone to war against Athenians. The Spartans consulted the oracle of Apollo at Delphi<sup>91</sup>. What seems so important is an explanation that Apollo offered to assist the Spartans and her allies in the war<sup>92</sup>. Delphi had taken the side of Sparta and its allies. In 430 BC, the plague broke out in Athens. Thucydides claims that the events were in accord with it<sup>93</sup>.

It is said that the ancient people believed that there was a connection between the plague and Delphic Apollo's explicit promise of support to Sparta.<sup>94</sup> In the opinion of the people of Sparta and her allies, Apollo had punished Athenians since they were in the wrong side. Apollo had been assisting Peloponnesian League against Athenians and her allies; Delphi simply had decided to back and lead them. Delphi was believed to motivate the opposing city states against the cruelty of Athenians.

Any neutral arbitration role of the Delphi was ruled out by the declaration above. Delphi harnesses the values of the traditionally accepted religion to persuade the Spartans to go to war against

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<sup>88</sup> Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of The State*, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p.53

<sup>89</sup> Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. *Warfare in the Ancient World*. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989

<sup>90</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), p.197

<sup>91</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), 1. 118

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.118

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.54.4-5

<sup>94</sup> Please see: Palagia, Olga, Editor, *Art in Athens During the Peloponnesian War*, (Cambridge University Press)

Athenians. In addition, in that statement were provocations that were not meant as truth. It also exposes their traditional pattern in a way that the self-righteous attitude of the Delphi had to justify whatever they regard as truths in their pattern of perceptions<sup>95</sup>. That kind of expression may be extended to the point at which Delphi could be discarded as an arbitrator for conflict resolution.

What it means for the constructivist is ‘the institution’s steady erosion’ which is regarded as an unacceptable episode for him. He wants to show how the relationships between the city-states should be instead of trying to demonstrate how the Greek city-states were. And the ‘should be’ disguised by saying “This is how the relationships between the ancient city-states really are; here is their basic nature; this is what it is to be inter-state relations.” What does not fit in becomes entirely excluded. It is almost impossible to consider Apollo Temple in Delphi Peace loving under the certain conditions in which the supported party by Delphi sees the solution in resorting to violence.

So much was the fact. One last detail of story Thucydides tells us may solidify the meaning and function of Delphi among the cities. In around 422 B.C when Athens was defeated by Spartans, they had been enforced to accept the articles mainly concerning Delphi. The contents of the article reveal that Athens had been killing Spartans who were in fear trying to consult Delphi; that the temple of Apollo at Delphi lost its independence, was being run and conducted by Athens; that Athens abolished their court of justice; that system of taxation belonging to Delphi had been constantly submitted to Athens.<sup>96</sup>

### **8.1 Close Relations between Justification of War and Delphi**

What was the function and role of Delphi? Was it serving a right cause on the basis of brokering peaceful resolutions? Its role and functions could be made much clearer provided the focus was placed upon the rejection of binding arbitration or binding agreements. Attempts to avoid war were frequently linked with efforts to ensure the justice of one’s cause and thus to secure the support of the gods if war proved inevitable<sup>97</sup>.

In the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians and her allies believed that they had justice and the gods on their side because they had offered arbitration and Sparta and her allies refused it<sup>98</sup>. In contrary to Athenians and her allies’ belief, Spartans and her allies could maintain that they had justice and the

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<sup>95</sup> Please see: Aeger, S. L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World*, (Berkeley, 1996)

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, Books V-VI, P.33-39

<sup>97</sup> Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. *Warfare in the Ancient World*. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989

<sup>98</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), 1.140-41, 144-45

gods on their side; because they considered that Athens had been the first to break the peace treaty<sup>99</sup>. What they most sought in any war was a justification which needed rectifying by Delphi or by the similar religious institutions. The function and role of Delphi had been confined to a requirement that would meet the justification of the war decision and action.

Reus Smith, who believes Delphi to be a negotiator and arbitrator, neglects even to mention the Athenian consultation of the major oracular shrines at Dodona, Siwah before the Sicilian expedition.<sup>100</sup> Delphi was not mere religious institution that would monopolize the justification of the course of the war in accordance with the interest of the powers that predominates the temple of Apollo in Delphi, Other places such as Dodona and Siwah should have been taken into account as alternatives to the Delphi.<sup>101</sup> The functions and role of those places were the same as Delphi. Whilst Delphi was under control of Spartans and her allies, Dodona and Siwah stood to serve the need for Athenians and her allies in justifying their disposition in the war. But, those interstate religious institutions would be recorded to play a role as neither arbitrators nor negotiators on behalf of the parties involved in the war.

## 8.2 Delphi and Other Oracle Centers

Ancient people believed the plague to be imposed upon Athenians due to an oracle by Apollo, because Athenians were considered unjust and sinful.<sup>102</sup> If Apollo was assisting the Spartans, what could be done to counter this event? In 430 BC, the Athenian naval expedition decides to capture Epidaurus in order to seize control of the sanctuary of the healing god Asclepius. The Athenians imported Asclepius' cult from Epidaurus to Athens in 420 BC<sup>103</sup>.

To counter the situation indicated by Delphi the Athens set up another temple to creating oracle beneficial to the Athenians. Delphic Apollo may have stated that he would assist the Spartans and her allies at the outset of the war. But Athenians would seek to win Apollo's support in appeasing Delian Apollo. The need to turn to Delian Apollo was the most important explanation for the decision in 426/25 BC to purify the sacred island of Delos (Apollo's birthplace). The primary Athenian motive for the purification was to win the good will of Apollo.<sup>104</sup> It seems that the Athenian motive was rather religious than politics. Because, there had been a second outbreak of the

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 1.140-41, 144-45

<sup>100</sup> Please see: Palagia, Olga, Editor, *Art in Athens During the Peloponessian War*, (Cambridge University Press)

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

plague in 427-426 BC which had lasted almost a year<sup>105</sup>. In 422 BC Athenians expelled the living Delians as well. Diodorus adds a political explanation<sup>106</sup>. Athenians accuses the Delians of secret treaty negotiations with the Spartans. Religious and political motives were consistent, they reinforce each other<sup>107</sup>.

On the eve of the Sicilian expedition the Athenians consulted three of the most authoritative oracles: The oracle of Zeus at Siwah in Libya<sup>108</sup>, the oracle of Apollo at Delphi<sup>109</sup>, and the oracle of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus<sup>110</sup>. The Athenian leader and general Cimon consulted Zeus in 451 BC<sup>111</sup>, and Dodona served as a suitable alternative to Delphi. There was nothing wrong in consulting those oracles including Delphi. They used to consult more than one oracle on the same issue.

Hence, the Delphi was not in a position to play an important part in conflict resolution at all. The temple in Delphi had grave disadvantages when it came to conflict resolution. Its idiom was very simple: What its party (sometimes Sparta, sometimes Athena) supported was automatically right. What the other part supported was automatically wrong and nonsense<sup>112</sup>. Matter could not be decided on their merits because city loyalty and its power must have come first. Therefore the prevailing thinking idiom was inadequate and dangerous argument mode. Instead of constructive mediation and arbitration role there was attack and defence and the parading of righteousness. It follows that the performance was not directed to resolving the conflicts at all but to making an impression on the condemned city states. Such practices explicitly demonstrate that Delphi had been transformed into a conflict performance arena.

In opposing oracles in Delphi, Athenians basically had attempted to revive the oldest oracle centers in order to meet the need for the justification of their position in the war. The oracle of Zeus at Siwah in Libya, and the oracle of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus had been reconstructed under the conditions of Peloponnesian wars. Athenian and her ally's leaderships had been able now to tell their own people that gods/goddesses were backing them against Sparta and her allies that they were not alone in their struggle that their cause was fair, just and truthful.

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<sup>105</sup> Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), 3.87

<sup>106</sup> Diodorus Siculus, translated by C. H. Oldfather, *The Library of History*, (Harvard University Press, 1967), 12. 73. 1

<sup>107</sup> Ibid. 12. 73. 1

<sup>108</sup> Plutarch (1960). *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans. Baltimore: Penguin

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Please see: Palagia, Olga, Editor, *Art in Athens During the Peloponnesian War*, (Cambridge University Press

<sup>111</sup> Plutarch (1960). *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans. Baltimore: Penguin Bo

<sup>112</sup> Please see: Aeger, S. L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World*, (Berkeley, 1996)

### 8.3 Justice and Moral Purpose of City-states

Was the so-called rational pursuit of justice related to ‘the moral purpose of the ancient Greek city-states’? Concept of justice has a specific historical content depending on the economic formation, on the economic and social structures, and on the particular phase of cultural development. Outside of these concrete historical definitions, this category is devoid of content and formal. What does the justice of ancient people have in common with the modern international law? What is there in common between the justice of ancient city-states and justice of international law preached by the United Nations? What about economic motives in which calculation of interest had been mixed with consideration of injustice? Did the Greek city-states act in the way of considering the rational principle formulated by Aristotle when they were at war against each other? Was there really ‘a distinctive understanding of procedural justice’ shared by them in the negotiations?

Reus considers Greek city-states on the basis of moral purpose by relying on Aristotle’s writings, contemplates a form of communal life that envelopes city-states, and thus rationalizes it through the so-called rational pursuit of justice. His suggestion lacks any sort of criteria or rational basis. For Aristotle seems to refute Reus without great efforts by articulating most of the ancient people, citizens of the city-states, as loyal to despotic rulers. In the ancient period, “Most people’s seem to think that despotic rule is statesmanship, and are not ashamed to practice towards others treatment which they declare to be unjust and detrimental for themselves; for in their own internal affairs they demand just government, yet in their relations with other peoples they pay no attention to justice.”<sup>113</sup> says Aristotle. In practice one may see the implementation of Aristotle’s statement in the policy of Sparta. Plutarch indicates that ‘it is characteristic of Spartans to give priority to their country’s interests; justice, as they see it and understand it, is only whatever they believe will advance Sparta’<sup>114</sup> As seen in Aristotle’s statement, there was no rational pursuit of justice among the city-states.

### 9.1 Aristotle’s Definition and Constructivism

In Aristotle’s definition, we cannot see any kind of moral purpose of any city-state in connection to one another. On the contrary, in order for a state to experience a peaceful environment, Aristotle recommends a single state in isolation alternative to the existing ones. As for individual happiness, for the happiness of the state in relation to her neighbors Aristotle suggests self-sufficiency:

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<sup>113</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, translated by H. Rackham, (Harvard University Press, 1998), p.545

<sup>114</sup> Plutarch, *On Sparta*, translated by Richard J. A. Talbert, (Penguin Books, 1988), p.78

“Moreover it is possible even for a single state in isolation to be happy, that is one that is well governed, in as much as it is conceivable that a state might be carried on somewhere in isolation, enjoying good laws, and in such a state the system of the constitution will not be framed for the purpose of war or of overpowering its enemies.”<sup>115</sup>

It is outside the scope of this study to discuss whether self-sufficiency or dependency or both is a necessary condition for self-determining, however it may be plainly seen that Aristotle’s idealization of a state in peace had never existed into practice, but only an idealized concept for Aristotle’s doctrine to provide a valid and concrete reference system for the constitution of a state by making generalization of the practical internal and external conditions of the then ancient societies. In another word, peace was merely possible between the states provided they would have been isolated from each other. That is, the coexistence of them for Aristotle was very manifestation of possible war. Like a classical moralist, Aristotle did not seem aware that he was living in the antiquity; but, the constructivists miss his moral values, underplaying his data, and overrating his doctrine as the evidence of empirical facts. Aristotle’s definition of a city-state considered in a peaceful environment exposes a cruel fact that the state of the city states in relation to each other was constantly the state of war so long as the city states would coexist together. That kind of specific historical reality stands against the claims by Constructivists.

## **9.2 Aristotle’s Morality and That of Ancient People**

Could one convincingly refer to the point that the ancient people aimed at looking good to them? The relationships between them and the gods may be referred to as functional. It means there may have been no love in the affection as long as love itself is characterized in terms of utility. In order to make it clear one may need to turn to Aristotle’s reasoning. As Aristotle argues friendships, he considers the concern regarding the state of utility: “Hence in a friendship based on utility or on pleasure men love their friend for their own good or their own pleasure, and not as being the person loved, but as useful or agreeable. And therefore these friendships are based on accident, since the friend is not loved for what he is, but as affording some benefit or pleasure as the case may be.”<sup>116</sup> By accident, Aristotle means that “utility is not a permanent quality; it differs at different times.”<sup>117</sup> Such a description may be applied to the relationship between the ancient people and their gods and goddesses. When the particular conditions of the loyalty to the gods have passed away, the relation is

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p.547

<sup>116</sup> Aristotle, *Nichomeian Ethics*, p.459

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., p.459



dissolved, 'having existed merely as a means to that end.'<sup>118</sup> The loyalty of the ancient people to any particular god or goddess is easily broken off, shifting from one god/goddess to the other depending on the need and expectation of/from the particular event. The functionality of them has nothing to do with any kind of morality. In that respect, the morality imposed upon the ancient people remains merely a projection with which constructivists identify themselves. However, in the harsh and brute reality of the antiquity one may witness something different in contrast to what is expected of.

Briefly, the systematic approach of Aristotle brings him inevitably face to face with many maverick problems similar to the problem like whether a state in isolation for the happiness of her citizens and for the sake of avoiding war was possible. Aristotle spends a long time thrashing out the paradoxes. Despite the difficulties of resolving the paradoxes, Aristotle sticks to a belief system by which he manages to touch on a dimension of science which differentiates from the reflection of the mind of the ancient people. But, the poverty of the constructivists needs to interpret Aristotle's belief system as the empirical work. Unfortunately, the Constructivists may not notice that moralism of Constructivism plagues sociology and history, which tends to be both normative and descriptive since Constructivists have carried the metaphor of the institution of international law back in history to Thucydides and Oracles of Apollo temple at Delphi.

In brief, the moralist Aristotle had explained what a moral state had to do. But, the Athenians, Spartans, and the rest of the Greek world had not done it by not acting throughout their social and political lives according to the strictest ideals of Aristotle's virtue. Aristotle's ethics, as a whole, consisted partly of observation and partly of doctrine. He appears to have used his observations to bring the fact in to feed his ruminations about moral values. So it may be stated that the brute facts of the ancient city-states are frequently and deliberately bypassed among constructivists as well to ignore certain questions. But, their explanations do not remove the brute fact that the cultural, politics, economics and religious issues<sup>119</sup> of the ancient slave societies were not that of the modern world.

### **9.3 The Question of Morality in Slavery Societies**

In the ineffective and disqualified institution of Delphi, What kind of morality, on which the arbitration was supposed to be based, does Christian Reus mention of in regard to Oracle of Apollo?

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<sup>118</sup> Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, *Ancient World At War*, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005)

<sup>119</sup> For further information of devision of labour please see Piero Sraffa, Editor, *The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo*, Cambridge University Press, 1952

Was it a morality of Hermes where cheating belongs, of Ares where raging destruction belongs, of Dionysus where victimization belongs?<sup>120</sup> The necessity that shapes the norm of gods gives a necessity to each of their imaginable positions and prevents any single one from overstepping the limits conditioned by the slave labor system and presented by the images themselves. The function and role of Delphi is unfortunately assumed to have carried out certain tasks towards peace and conflict resolution although in practice the principles of the Delphic perspective could not be expected to have gone beyond the myth itself and were not general rule for all conduct and conflict between the city-states<sup>121</sup>. There was no place the oracles at the Delphi could have stood beyond the reach of myths which involved them in their positions according to the interests of the dominant city.

By considering morals as the claims of the imaginal arbitration, morality itself becomes imaginable. In the daily life of the antiquity, morality had been rooted in gods/goddesses images and gods/goddesses images were moral powers. These images reminded them that they were not alone in their brutal experience of life; in their choices and decisions they were reflecting mythic stances of gods/ goddesses. But the moralities were not designated to implement justice; because they were not willing to apply justice. Displays of indifference to justice were a means of self-preservation for the Athenians and for the rest of the city-states, who found themselves without prospects and exposed constantly to the brutal forces of so-called fate. The consciousness of the Athenians had been consumed by regarding superior themselves to the others. It was a needed preconception in justifying slavery as a defence mechanism. Meanwhile, that form of defence mechanism had generated and reproduced its own moral values through power politics which were justified and reflected in the moral values themselves.

The archetypal viewpoint of mythological stance of the gods/goddesses was supposed to have attempted to shift the focus of the Greeks from the question of good and evil together<sup>122</sup>. Subsequently one may easily claim that the Greeks had not looked to myths morally, but looked at moralities mythically. For the more effectively justice is hidden in society, the more zealously it is sought in divine good<sup>123</sup>. What it may mean is that for any action they were not concerned with morality, but with the interpretation of event in regard to respective gods/goddesses according to their desire and conditions, etc. Mythical understanding conjures forces that are not personal, not rational, and perhaps not altogether human. Such an understanding thus becomes crucial since myths

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<sup>120</sup> Please see Homer, *The Iliad, The Odyssey*, translated by Robert Fitzgerald, (Oxford University Press, 1984)

<sup>121</sup> Please see: Aeger, S. L. *Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World*, (Berkeley, 1996)

<sup>122</sup> Please see: Nigel, M. Kennel, *Spartans*, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

set the unruly imagination on course; that is, they were therapeutic. And why? Because they were thought to have spoken truth as long as justification was at stake.

## **10.1 Conclusion**

The Constructivism may be really complacent about the Delphi's existing structure; because they believe the Delphi to be an excellent institution. However, the Delphi in reality had not been designed for conflict resolution. The Delphi was not capable of carrying out the functions attributed to it by Constructivism.

The group of the city states had organized into a structure that seems to have directed the activities of the city states in a very devastating and destructive way in which the design of the Delphi was conceptualized towards making contributions to the ends of war. In such a vital period conflict resolution had never been in sight.

In addition, political authority and religious institutions were inseparable in the city-states' life.<sup>124</sup> The ancient population of the city-states would regard religious motives as mere pretext for pragmatic political actions. The potential manipulators would harness the gods as powerful tools. Both the Spartans and Athenians including the rest of the city-states employed religion as a political weapon. They also believed the gods themselves were taking an active role in the war and that support of the gods could be either won or lost by human actions.

The increasing complexity of the slavery world inevitably invalidated Delphi, forcing it to misperceive and misjudge the events. Delphi lacks the key qualities as an arbitrator; because as a third party the Delphi appears to look at the situation from either party other than from the third party angle. That is, Delphi as a third party with no impartiality was like judge or negotiator. It was not a body on the basis of being a creative impartial designer that could have been expected to be approaching things independently of judge and partial negotiator.

Delphi did not have the structures necessary for the resolution of conflicts. The Structures of the Delphi had been designed for proslavery period. It had been inadequate, incompetence and ill will for the existing slavery city states.

It is revealed that the Delphi organization could not perform the third party role in the design of conflicts. Its historical nature rules that role out due to historically different periods. Briefly Delphi

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<sup>124</sup> Please see Palagia, Olga, Edt., *Art in Athens During the Peloponessian War*, Cambridge University Press

did not appear to have provided a structure to carry out a reasonable approach to conflict resolution. It shows a remarkable lack of vision and outdated capacity.

What is more dangerous is the belief on the part of the Delphi that an inadequate structure is thought to be adequate. That belief completely blocks the search for a better understanding of Antiquity. When Reus Smith seems to be no longer able to deny the existence of fragmentary autonomous systems and no longer able to deal with actual contemporary international relations, then there arises the fantasy of returning to Greek city states system. For the return to Greek city states system offers a way of coping when the main institutions of the international system cannot hold and things fall apart. A return to Greek city states has been an ideological response to the challenge of breakdown; it offers a model of disintegrated integration. Briefly, the ancient world was a world plagued by constant war without the presence of independent and reliable third parties as arbitrators.

The analysis of some certain events demonstrates that Delphi's and the city states' methods of solving major disputes and conflicts had been crude and primitive, inadequate and destructive. Instead of resolving conflicts in a constructive manner; the attempt and efforts in general led to a further chaos and messy events.

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